How real is the threat of a new war in the South Caucasus?

It's difficult to say, but the chances of escalating conflict are much higher between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh than between Georgia and Russia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. There is no substantial military build-up between Georgia on the one hand and Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia on the other, while the tension has been declining over the last year and the parties are at least talking. It remains of course a threat that cannot be ignored.

In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh the military build-up between Armenia and Azerbaijan is continuing to this day, accompanied by aggressive messages from both sides instead of tangible progress in the Minsk Group and Russia's mediation initiative.

What is the place of countries like Azerbaijan in NATO's new Strategic Concept?

I think Azerbaijan will notice little of the new Strategic Concept which is now in place. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme continues and Azerbaijan keeps working with NATO through the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP).

Next to that, Azerbaijan is of course crucial to NATO's mission in Afghanistan since it provides an important transport hub.

Do you think that after the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 NATO could play a role in ensuring security in the region?

I think NATO's role in the South Caucasus declined as a result of the 2008 war [between Georgia and Russia]. Georgia's membership is off the table for the foreseeable future while Armenia and Azerbaijan do not have membership ambitions.

Interest in Armenia and Azerbaijan in ties with NATO is also slightly declining, now that both countries are familiar with the IPAP procedures and NATO can offer little more at this point.

May we hope that some day Russia will not object to accession to NATO? What should the conditions be for that?

The most obvious condition would be Russia's membership of NATO. This is highly unlikely, though, because NATO and Russia's military are not interoperable.

Also NATO demands democratic reforms in member countries and this is also a hurdle for both parties to agree on. Now Russia remains suspicious of NATO. If Russia were on board, the whole geographical outlook of NATO would change and countries like China might feel threatened which might also be a consideration in assessing the difficulty in Russia ever becoming a member. NATO will have to strengthen and revise its partnership strategy to build relations with Russia, while at the same time being able to step up cooperation with the three South Caucasus and East European countries.

Do you believe in imminent progress on the Karabakh conflict? And do you see NATO being involved in the settlement process?

I hope progress on Nagorno-Karabakh can be made, because both Armenia and Azerbaijan are running out of time. Azerbaijan will likely see a decline in energy revenues over the coming years while Armenia's isolation will increase further without movement on Nagorno-Karabakh. Hopefully this will result in both sides becoming more flexible in their negotiations instead of one party trying to force a solution.

I do not see an active role for NATO in this process alongside the OSCE Minsk Group. An increased EU role would be an option because it is better equipped in guiding negotiations and in providing assistance and peace support mechanisms during and after a settlement process.

Leyla Tagiyeva
News.Az