The Middle East edges toward nuclear multipolarity
Editor's note: Russian military-political analyst, expert in the field of strategic security, specialist in the Middle East and Africa Vladimir Bekish. The article expresses the personal opinion of the author and may not coincide with the view of News.Az.
There are countless events unfolding across the globe every day, and many are worthy of reflection. But some deserve far more than passing attention — especially those that directly impact international security and the future of entire nations. Among these, the issue of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology demands particular scrutiny. And today, all eyes should be on the Middle East — with Iran at the center, and Israel and now Saudi Arabia drawn deeper into the equation.
The international conversation surrounding Iran’s nuclear program has been reignited, largely in response to the return of Donald Trump to the White House. True to form, Trump issued a familiar ultimatum to Tehran: stop all activities that could lead to the development of nuclear weapons, or face devastating consequences. Iran, as it has in the past, initially took a defiant stance, stating it would not yield to pressure. It insisted that its program was peaceful — but also reminded the world that if necessary for self-defense, it could develop a nuclear weapon within a week.
Source: The Cradle
This aggressive rhetoric has long defined the U.S.–Iran dynamic. Yet despite the mutual hostility and deep mistrust, both sides have once again returned to the negotiating table — though not without gritted teeth. This new chapter of nuclear diplomacy, cautious and tense, took a significant turn last Saturday, when Iranian and American representatives held a high-level meeting in Muscat, Oman, under the mediation of the Sultanate's government. According to Iran’s IRNA news agency, it was the first official diplomatic interaction between the two nations since Trump’s return to power in January 2025.
The process itself reflected the delicacy of the situation. Iranian and American negotiators were placed in separate rooms within the same building, while Omani Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr Albusaidi shuttled between them, facilitating the exchange of written proposals. Over the course of two and a half hours, the two delegations exchanged four messages, culminating in a short face-to-face meeting between the heads of both sides, with the Omani minister present. Though brief, this encounter carries significant weight: for years, Trump had attempted to establish direct contact with Iran’s leadership — without success.
According to regional media outlet Amwaj Media, Trump’s special envoy, Steve Whitkoff, personally represented Washington during the talks. Tehran, in turn, was represented by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. This marked their first official and direct communication under the renewed Trump administration. While the exact substance of the dialogue remains undisclosed, sources suggest that the talks were “constructive.”
More importantly, according to diplomatic leaks, Iran signaled its readiness to return to the uranium enrichment levels outlined in the original Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). As of now, Iran is enriching uranium at levels twenty times higher than the JCPOA permits. In exchange for de-escalating its nuclear activities, Iran is seeking concrete economic incentives: the lifting of sanctions affecting its nuclear sector, access to frozen state assets, and the removal of pressure on countries that import Iranian oil.
Source: Brusselsmorning
Notably, Washington appears to have softened its previous red lines. No longer is the demand for a full dismantling of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure front and center. Instead, the United States is seeking robust international oversight from the IAEA and other bodies to ensure transparency and limit Iran’s missile development capabilities — especially in collaboration with Tehran’s regional allies.
Of course, while the resumption of dialogue is a positive step, the outcome remains highly uncertain. Deep contradictions persist, and the gaps between both sides’ expectations are wide. Nonetheless, the very fact that a meeting took place — and that a second round is scheduled for April 19 in Rome — is notable. At the very least, it suggests that for now, the risk of a sudden military confrontation between Iran and the U.S.–Israel alliance has been reduced.
But that sense of relief is not shared in Jerusalem. Israeli officials continue to view any deal with Iran with profound skepticism. They remain convinced that Tehran has no intention of halting its pursuit of nuclear weapons and is merely playing for time. Israel insists that any agreement must also address Iran’s support for regional militant groups such as the Houthis in Yemen, Hamas in Gaza, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Most significantly, Israel demands that Tehran abandon its longstanding goal of destroying the Jewish state — something the Iranian leadership has never renounced.
Meanwhile, another regional heavyweight has entered the nuclear conversation with growing determination: Saudi Arabia. With its vast territory, formidable economy, and geopolitical influence, the Kingdom is no bystander in this emerging order. For years, Riyadh’s relationship with Washington has been defined by strategic alignment and mutual suspicion. Under Trump’s previous term, the U.S. succeeded in persuading Saudi Arabia to recognize Israel, but this came with strings attached. One of them was U.S. support for Saudi Arabia’s security against Iran — and critically, a green light for Saudi Arabia’s peaceful nuclear ambitions.
Officially, Saudi Arabia seeks to develop nuclear power to diversify its energy mix and reduce domestic oil consumption. In reality, few doubt that Riyadh also wants strategic parity with Iran. As tensions escalate, the Kingdom has taken concrete steps. On Sunday, American and Saudi officials met to discuss a nuclear deal that would allow Riyadh to access U.S. nuclear technology — potentially including uranium enrichment. U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright confirmed the negotiations during his visit to the Kingdom, emphasizing that “it is critical that the U.S. be the partner of choice.”
Source: Politico
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has long made his intentions clear: if Iran gets the bomb, Saudi Arabia will get one too. Over the years, Riyadh has explored nuclear partnerships with China and Russia. But today, it is the United States — not Beijing or Moscow — that Riyadh sees as its preferred partner.
This raises the alarm on yet another front. If Iran is edging closer to nuclear capabilities, and Saudi Arabia is openly seeking nuclear parity, then we are already witnessing the collapse of the nonproliferation status quo in the Middle East. Add to that Israel, which has long been recognized — though never officially — as a nuclear-armed state, and the United Arab Emirates, which operates a civilian nuclear plant built by South Korea. Though peaceful in purpose, such facilities remain exposed to military threats. A single missile strike on the UAE’s plant could trigger a regional catastrophe worse than Chernobyl.
What we are seeing is the dangerous normalization of nuclear capability in one of the most volatile regions in the world. The Middle East is becoming a nuclear multipolar zone — where deterrence, rivalry, and miscalculation are on a knife’s edge. It is no longer a question of “if,” but “when” the balance tips beyond the point of return.
The stakes are enormous — not just for the Middle East, but for the entire international order. The coming months will test the durability of nuclear diplomacy, the effectiveness of global nonproliferation mechanisms, and the strategic wisdom of Washington’s choices. For now, the world watches — but it must not do so passively.
Because when the nuclear threshold is crossed in the Middle East, the fallout — political, strategic, and potentially radioactive — will reach far beyond the region’s borders.
(If you possess specialized knowledge and wish to contribute, please reach out to us at opinions@news.az).
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