Pezeshkian speaks: Inside Iran’s new strategic vision — economy, energy, war
In an extensive and unusually candid interview with Khamenei.ir, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian laid out what may be the most comprehensive explanation of his government’s priorities since taking office. The conversation, spanning domestic policy, economic hardship, energy reform, regional diplomacy, and Iran’s confrontation with Western pressure, paints a picture of a leadership attempting to stabilize a country under sanctions while restructuring the internal machinery of the state. More than announcements of achievements, Pezeshkian’s interview reads like a roadmap — a blueprint for how his administration views Iran’s problems and its path through them.
The President opens with gratitude. He repeatedly stresses that without the continuous support of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, both publicly and privately, his government would be facing far deeper challenges. The Supreme Leader’s backing is described not as symbolic but operational — a necessary foundation for the government’s work. Here Pezeshkian introduces his core argument: Iran already has a 20-Year Vision Plan, and governments should not discard it each time a new president arrives. Instead of replacing strategies, he believes presidents must continue existing national projects, complete unfinished infrastructure, and maintain policy continuity rather than pursue isolated personal agendas. The failure, in his view, has not been the lack of plans, but the lack of consistent execution over two decades.
From that point forward, the interview becomes a detailed tour through the structural problems Iran faces — not only political, but technical, economic, social, and infrastructural. Pezeshkian describes the country as suffering from “imbalances” on many fronts: energy shortages, water scarcity, inefficient consumption, budget mismanagement, centralized bureaucracy, inequalities in education, and uneven development between provinces. The mission his cabinet has set for itself is not a single project, but rather correcting the architecture of governance itself.
Nowhere is this more visible than in energy. When Pezeshkian took office, Iran confronted a 20,000-megawatt power deficit, which later deepened to nearly 30,000 MW due to severe drought and the drop in hydropower generation. The country had almost 14,000 MW of hydropower capacity, but little water behind dams. Meanwhile consumption was growing by 5–6% per year while almost no new power generation had been added. Faced with the risk of blackouts, the administration turned to the fastest deployable option: solar power.
The result is notable. For years, Iran had only 1,000 MW of solar capacity. Pezeshkian states that his government brought 3,000 MW online, with another 800 MW being added imminently, and large-scale solar installations are being commissioned at a rate of 300 MW per week. More importantly, contracts for 80,000 MW of solar energy have already been signed. If implemented even partially, this would transform Iran’s energy landscape and reduce reliance on gas-fired power plants, while cutting CO₂ emissions by millions of tons annually.
The government also revived several combined-cycle power plants. Iran has nearly 7,000 MW of combined-cycle capacity, of which 3,000 MW have now been activated, with the remaining 4,000 MW scheduled for completion. Additionally, after tightening oversight over cryptocurrency mining — a major and previously uncontrolled consumer of electricity — Iran managed to reclaim around 2,000 MW of capacity. For the first time in years, electricity consumption growth reversed — instead of rising 5%, it fell by 5%, saving the equivalent of 3–4,000 MW.
Energy is also being captured rather than flared. Iran historically burned billions of dollars’ worth of gas at wellheads. Pezeshkian says the potential gain from flaring reduction is 5–6 billion dollars annually, and his government has already increased captured gas to 15 million cubic meters per day, compared to only 9 million cumulatively achieved in all previous years. Contracts are being signed to capture the remaining volumes. His message is clear: Iran has resources, but management must change.
Infrastructure is another cornerstone. Pezeshkian lists three critical corridors the state intends to complete: Astara–Rasht, Shalamcheh–Basra, and Zahedan–Chabahar. Collectively, they represent Iran’s attempt to position itself as the regional transit hub connecting East–West and North–South trade, linking Russia and Central Asia to the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus to Pakistan, and China to Europe via land. More than 10–12 trillion tomans have already been spent, with another similar tranche ready. On the Shalamcheh–Basra line, underwater foundations have been built and minefields cleared. On Astara–Rasht, land acquisition rose from 30 km at the time Pezeshkian took office to 115 km today. He says the goal is to finish these routes within the year. Iran is also acquiring diesel engines, freight wagons, and equipment to ensure throughput. These corridors are more than transport — they are Iran’s attempt to break isolation through economic geography rather than diplomacy alone.
Regional relations feature prominently as well. Pezeshkian describes an improvement with neighboring countries, naming Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE, as well as deeper engagement with China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Despite sanctions, he insists Iran’s external ties and trade channels are expanding, contradicting Western portrayals of isolation.
Yet political stability, he argues, depends less on foreign relations and more on internal unity. His tone becomes firm when discussing the 12-Day War and the West’s expectation that Iranian society would collapse. Instead, he says, society rallied behind the system and the Leader. The true battlefield, he warns, is not military — it is internal cohesion versus division. Western adversaries, he believes, have shifted to media and psychological warfare, trying to portray Iran as weak and exhausted, betting on internal strife. His answer is for Iran’s elites to argue privately but speak publicly with one voice, following the Leader’s direction. Without unity, no government can solve problems. With unity, Iran cannot be broken — “not in 36 months, not even in 36,000 years,” he declares.
Economic grievances, however, are real — and he acknowledges them directly. Oil revenue has fallen from around 75 to 50 dollars per barrel, reducing national income while war and sanctions disrupt production. Pezeshkian’s government plans to allocate 2.5 billion dollars in subsidies and electronic coupons before the New Year to support vulnerable households. He emphasizes that subsidy distribution must change: currently, fuel subsidies mostly benefit car owners, though only 50–60% of Iranians own private vehicles. Owners of multiple cars receive multiple pockets of subsidies — a system he calls unfair and irrational. Iran imported 5 billion dollars in gasoline, purchased at around 60,000 tomans, and sold domestically for 1,500–3,000 tomans, a massive gap funded by the state.
His proposal is controversial but clear — subsidies should shift from vehicles to people, equally, and eventually in a digital format. He stresses this is not price inflation but redistribution for justice. But reforms require cultural support. Parliament must cooperate. Media must help the public understand the logic. The budget submitted for next year increases spending by only 2%, compared to historical jumps of 40–50%, signaling a decisive break with expansionary fiscal habits. Government expenses must be cut, not increased. He criticizes spending foreign currency reserves on mobile phone imports while food security and livestock feed face shortages. “If I must choose between phones and bread, I choose bread,” he says.
From here, Pezeshkian moves into what may be the philosophical core of the interview: Iran must change how it consumes. He argues that Iran uses two to three times more electricity and gas than Europe, and even a 10% nationwide reduction would be enough to close critical welfare gaps. He calls wastefulness un-Islamic and quotes the Quran. He describes turning off lights, stopping heating in unused rooms, shutting down his private pool, and using a reading lamp rather than lighting an entire building. His point is symbolic — leadership by example. “If we save just ten percent, we solve many problems,” he insists.
Security, despite economic focus, remains a pillar. He states the Iranian Armed Forces today are stronger than during previous attacks, in equipment and personnel. If attacked again, the response will be more decisive — but his goal is deterrence, not escalation. The real danger is not foreign missiles, but internal fragmentation. If society trusts the government, participates in policies, and sees justice, the enemy loses hope of intervention.
Justice is not a slogan in this interview — it is a repeated theme. Pezeshkian insists he must serve all Iranians equally regardless of ethnicity, faith, gender, or language. He invokes Imam Ali refusing extra funds to his own brother as a model of governance. “Justice must be shown through action, not speeches,” he says.
In his closing words, Pezeshkian quotes a verse: “In the sanctuary of the intoxicated with Divine love, neither ‘we’ nor ‘I’ remain — it is all Him.” With that, he returns to the beginning — unity, humility, and service. Iran’s problems require sacrifice, cooperation, and social participation. Government alone cannot fix everything; the people must join the effort. The country has wealth — energy, gas, geography, human capital — but must learn discipline, reduce waste, complete long-term projects, manage subsidies rationally, and maintain cohesion. The struggle is continuous, not momentary.
The interview offers no illusions. Pezeshkian does not claim easy victory. He describes Iran as engaged in a complex, multi-layered war with the United States, Israel, and Europe — economic, media, cultural, political, security-based rather than purely military. But his message to Western capitals is implicit: collapse will not come through sanctions and pressure. Iran intends to survive through unity, self-reliance, infrastructure, energy transition, and social justice.
The scale of challenges is enormous. But so is the scale of the agenda he outlines. If even half of the promised 80,000 MW solar contracts materialize, if corridors open, if waste is reduced, if subsidies are restructured, and if unity holds, Iran could enter a new phase of internal transformation — not despite pressure, but because of it.
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