From drones to trade: What’s next for Türkiye–Kazakhstan relations? – INTERVIEW
As ties among the Turkic states continue to deepen, particular attention is being paid to the evolving partnership between Türkiye and Kazakhstan. The recent visit of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to Ankara, along with the signing of a Joint Declaration and the decisions of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council, signaled a clear intention to strengthen bilateral cooperation.

Photo: Turkish expert Engin Ozer
In an interview with News.Az, Turkish expert Engin Ozer shared his insights on the political, economic, and logistical prospects of this partnership, as well as Türkiye’s role in the development of the Trans-Caspian route and the opening of the Zangezur corridor.
– President Tokayev recently paid an official visit to Türkiye. Does the signing of the Joint Declaration and the decisions of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council mark a new phase in political, economic, and defense cooperation between Ankara and Astana?

Source: kaztag.kz
– The visit primarily focused on trade and several infrastructure and investment-related projects. At this point, it would be premature to say that this could evolve into full-fledged defense cooperation between the two countries. Such cooperation is likely to remain limited—for example, Kazakhstan has already begun acquiring Turkish drones, but there is no indication yet of expansion into a broader defense partnership.
As for the broader picture, the emerging Turkic alliance increasingly resembles a version of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which has lost much of its former appeal in Russia. Türkiye is seeking to fill this vacuum by enhancing trade and economic interaction. However, this is not about undermining any particular actor—rather, it is about Türkiye expanding its regional influence through soft power.
– The two sides actively discussed expanding trade and increasing exports of Kazakh goods to Türkiye. In your view, what concrete steps could help achieve President Erdoğan’s stated goal of boosting bilateral trade to $15 billion?
![]()
Source: Anadolu
– This primarily concerns grain exports, an area where Kazakhstan has significant production capacity. Many countries are interested in importing Kazakh grain, as food security has become a national priority worldwide. There is currently heavy reliance on Ukraine and Russia in this field. However, due to the ongoing war and instability in Russian ports—especially those in the Black Sea—such supply chains now carry considerable risks.
Russian ports are no longer considered safe, and international insurance firms often refuse to cover ships that dock in them. This includes Turkish vessels, which face the added risk of sanctions. Against this backdrop, Kazakhstan is increasingly seen as a promising alternative supplier.
Türkiye is also keen to increase imports of Kazakh oil, which requires reliable logistical infrastructure. The same applies to grain transportation. Kazakhstan is eager to export its agricultural products, and dependable routes through third countries are essential. In this context, Türkiye can serve as a key transit hub.
As for the $15 billion trade volume goal—it appears somewhat unrealistic in the short term. But over the next 10 years, it is a fully achievable target, provided that both countries continue expanding cooperation and addressing existing infrastructure challenges.
– One of the priorities mentioned is the implementation of projects in the transport and logistics sector, particularly the development of the Trans-Caspian route. How ready is Türkiye to participate in the construction of new ports, railways, and logistics hubs in Kazakhstan?

Source: APA
– This question is directly tied to the unblocking of regional transport corridors in the South Caucasus—specifically, the Zangezur corridor. If the project is implemented, and it seems we are already nearing the final phase, it will open up significant new logistical opportunities in the region. Although U.S. companies are unlikely to be involved in this process, a degree of compromise between the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan appears to have been reached. Once the route is finalized and technically operational, we can expect a substantial increase in trade flow through this corridor.
Regarding Turkish investments in the Caspian region, such initiatives currently appear unlikely. The issue is not a lack of financial resources—Türkiye does have funds. However, in the current economic climate, most Turkish companies prefer to place their assets in interest-bearing financial institutions. About 50% of Turkish banks are facing liquidity challenges, making long-term infrastructure investments—especially around the Caspian Sea—less attractive.
Projects of this scale require government support, but under Türkiye’s current macroeconomic conditions, this also presents difficulties. In my view, real momentum for such initiatives may only come after 2027, once Türkiye’s economic situation stabilizes and conditions improve for long-term investment.
By Tural Heybatov





