Reflections on Pakistan’s strategic and political fault lines
Editor’s note: Lieutenant General Asad Ahmed Durrani is a retired three-star general of the Pakistan Army. He previously served as Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Director General of Military Intelligence. He is currently active as a commentator, speaker, and author. The article reflects the author’s personal views and does not necessarily represent the position of News.Az.
In the late 1950s, Mao Zedong’s books were available on the streets of Anarkali for two rupees apiece. Maybe that’s why some of us, then students at the nearby Government College, were tempted to buy them. I have no idea why his famous red book made little impression on me, but the one titled On Contradiction did, even though it was so convoluted that, for someone trying to earn a bachelor’s degree in science, following its thread was more complex than chemically analyzing a soldier. I did that a couple of years later, after donning an army uniform, and even got it published in a military journal, earning a princely honorarium of 25 rupees.
Later in service, I was often reminded of what I thought the great man had in mind. While evaluating threats, one looked for contradictions in the enemy’s force structure, and in its social fabric. When the Soviet Union collapsed, I was heading the ISI. Analyzing the causes came with the job, and so did the decision that the mission was too critical to be entrusted to any single person or group. Most conclusions had plenty in common and were therefore embedded in my memory.
That the Empire went down the tube while its colossal military machine and impressive range of nuclear weapons merely stood by twiddling their thumbs raised no eyebrows. All states are somewhat oligarchic — one might recall hearing the maverick Bernie Sanders reiterate that only the other day, but in Soviet Russia, since the system had a stranglehold over public opinion, hardly anyone knew that the oligarchs were minting money under state patronage. This certainly contributed to the decline, as did the unbridled power of the Nomenklatura: a select group chosen by the permanent establishment (the Communist Party) that had the ultimate say in national affairs.
Another cause is so common that many accept it as a fait accompli. Some even consider it essential to a nation’s legacy. Bavaria was bankrupt, yet King Ludwig II mortgaged his country to construct castles now counted among the world’s finest. The Kremlin spent its meager resources building underground stations that attracted more art lovers than passengers. And before one forgets: in modern times, no other country “disappeared” people more constructively than the Russians. Siberia was sparsely populated and needed slave labor to tap its vast potential. Dissidents came in handy. The problem was that the very people incarcerated were those warning of the impending meltdown. With them gone, no one remained to sound the alarm, and the hired hands applauded the Empire all the way to the train wreck.

Source: theroyaltourblog
A muscular approach to suppressing domestic unrest has always been a bad idea and has often resulted in state implosion. In the Subcontinent, the precedent set by us in 1971 was followed by Bangladesh and Nepal, but mercifully their vibrant civil societies saved them before the demagogues could do lasting damage.
The Soviets also rode roughshod over their satellites. Uprisings in Hungary and Czechoslovakia were ruthlessly put down. With NATO on its western borders and China no longer an ideological ally in the east, who in the Kremlin, in the right frame of mind, would have invaded Afghanistan? I learned many years later that Brezhnev made that decision against military advice. It didn’t take Moscow long to realize the blunder, but errors of strategy are far more difficult to correct. The one-man misadventure took many years before the occupation was rolled back.
Since success has many fathers, both the Afghans and we believed that the duo had delivered the coup de grâce. Be that as it may, the meltdown was so sudden and swift that it seemed the empire had been hit by a tsunami. I am not sure when I first heard the term “imperial overstretch,” but in this case, the attempt to keep pace with the West’s Star Wars initiative clearly ran the Soviets out of steam.
The United States, now uncontested at the global pinnacle, launched the New World Order. The way it conducted the 1991 Gulf War indicated how it intended to proceed. Saudi apprehensions and the advice of its own CENTCOM commander, Schwarzkopf, were ignored; the UN was arm-twisted into blessing the eviction of the Republican Guard from Kuwait; and countries with extra cash — Germany, Japan, and the oil kingdoms — were told to pick up the tab. Thereafter, it became the norm. If the world body provided a fig leaf for an American project, well and good; otherwise, the sole superpower bulldozed ahead regardless.
Consequently, the upstart empire took barely a decade before losing momentum. If it is still alive and (virtually) kicking, even when down or out, it is because it did not suffer from the range of contradictions that crippled its former rival. Assets such as a decentralized structure, personal freedoms, absence of state suppression, and, most importantly, popular participation sustained its status. What inspires confidence in that system is the fact that one does not have to belong to a dynasty to rise to the top. Obama, Trump, and Mamdani are a few illustrious examples.

Source: Reuters
“Liberating individualistic energies transformed America from the child and ward to the rival and guardian of Western Europe,” surmised the historian duo Will and Ariel Durant. Many may regard the U.S. as a greater evil than its late adversary, but it still has its wicked charms. Hollywood once ruled the screens — we even skipped classes to watch a good western. The invention of jeans had a greater impact on human civilization than launching satellites into space. And it turned out to be the only power that, where the rest of the world, along with its much-touted international organizations and billions spent on humanitarian aid, failed, provided some relief from the sub-human conditions in Gaza. Trump may utter inanities, but though fully cognizant that he will go back on them, all of us remain on edge until he fires his next verbal salvo.
It is up to us now to judge our own country against the standards set by the two mightiest powers of the previous century. Pakistan has more than its share of imbalances and incongruities: between the military and the non-military; the state and society; the federating units; rich and poor; those above and those below the law; and dissident movements in the two western provinces acquiring lives of their own.
In principle, policies and decisions, since they affect a nation’s well-being and future, must be exhaustively brainstormed, and the golden rule for meaningful discourse is due deference to opposing views.
If I recall correctly, it was in 2018 that some colleagues in this business walked up to me and complained that, in matters of “freedom of expression,” things were now worse than under Zia. No wonder public debate has been captured by a choir that claps and sings in unison behind the head qawwal.
Within the Armed Forces, the Army is the predominant service. The need for coordination with the other two branches was starkly felt during the 1965 war. It led to the creation of the Joint Services Headquarters, tasked with ensuring cooperation. To convince the Navy and Air Force that they were invaluable parts of the whole, adequate representation was ensured. The top post, too, was to be rotated among the services, especially because the air and naval arms were now acquiring greater importance in warfare. The four-day round in May this year provided proof, if any was needed. The 27th Constitutional Amendment practically places them under the command of the Army Chief.
On the external front, relations with Afghanistan were essentially maintained to keep our western flank as trouble-free as possible. We even risked the ire of the two superpowers to restore the era when the Afghans, even in their angriest moments, acted rationally in their own interest, and kept our western borders quiet when the eastern ones were not. The present situation has landed the country in the jaws of a nutcracker.

Source: ndtvimg
Fueling these divides would have been India’s best option, but Modi instead targeted our military, not only forging domestic unity, even if temporarily, but also aiming for our strength instead of our fault lines. No one, however, can ensure that our Achilles’ heel — internal discord — ceases to be an attractive target except ourselves, by working toward the willing participation of the people.
Among other reasons, devolution was therefore an accepted principle of public administration. We, however, continued to concentrate power, which is now firmly in the hands of one man — the Army Chief. Small wonder that our current hybrid regime has fallen short on most, if not all, criteria for success.
With numerous suspects, both within and outside, there is little chance we will ever know who, for example, carried out the suicide attack outside the Supreme Court, or whether, like in Murder on the Orient Express, all our nemeses joined hands against us. Worse still, the leadership refuses to undertake any course correction. Our only chance lies in a successor dispensation capable of forging consensus, minimizing external and internal cleavages, and accepting that, contrary to its own doctrines that insurgencies and internal dissent are essentially political matters, the Pakistan military is now spearheading the charge.
Having witnessed the Army’s botched ventures, from coups to Kargil, many an old soldier agrees that civilian oversight is the lesser of all evils. The present bunch of politicians, however, seems to find playing second fiddle to the man on horseback a better option.
As I was losing faith, the infidel became a believer.
(If you possess specialized knowledge and wish to contribute, please reach out to us at opinions@news.az).





