Truce is impossible: Why the war in Ukraine will continue
Editor's note: Dmitry Solonnikov is a Russian political scientist, director of the Institute of Contemporary State Development Dmitry Solonnikov. The article expresses the personal opinion of the author and may not coincide with the view of News.az.
As reported by Reuters, the slowdown in U.S. arms deliveries to Ukraine in President Joe Biden’s final year in office is not solely due to congressional inaction. Internal debates within Washington over the risks of escalating the conflict with Russia and concerns about the depletion of U.S. weapons stockpiles have also played a significant role. But what does this shift mean for the battlefield and Kyiv’s strategy moving forward?
The issue of arms supplies to Ukraine is multifaceted. On one hand, NATO stockpiles are depleting, and current production rates are failing to keep up with battlefield consumption—particularly in munitions and critical components. The West can no longer supply weapons at the same pace or volume as in 2023.
At the same time, alternative sources of weaponry are being explored. For example, there is talk of transferring air defense missiles to Ukraine that Israel previously used but might no longer need due to a perceived reduction in its security threats. Such backchannel arms transfers are indeed taking place.
Another critical factor is the attempt to reinvigorate the defense-industrial base in both the U.S. and Europe. The arms industry is receiving massive orders, and ambitions are high, but ramping up production takes time—typically 18 to 24 months. Some processes are already underway, yet full-scale output remains at least a year away.
Beyond geopolitics, military-industrial lobbying plays a decisive role. Arms supply contracts involve colossal sums of money, vested interests, corruption schemes, and kickbacks. It is imperative for those involved that the conflict continues, ensuring a steady flow of financial resources.
This reality has led to a dynamic where responsibility for military aid is shuffled between allies—at times, the U.S. provides more, at others, Europe takes the lead. Sometimes, a tug-of-war emerges between NATO members over who should bear the burden.
Political cycles also influence decision-making. For instance, after Donald Trump’s potential return to power was announced, there were signals that military aid to Ukraine might be reduced. However, within days, deliveries resumed. The reason is clear: the American military-industrial complex is not interested in losing lucrative contracts. Even when a president discusses cutting costs, major arms manufacturers exert pressure to maintain their profits.
A similar trend has been observed in the final years of Biden’s presidency—sustaining war efforts is deemed necessary, orders must be fulfilled, yet missile reserves continue to dwindle. As a result, arms shipments fluctuate in cycles—sometimes slowing down, sometimes accelerating again.
In the medium and long term, arms shipments to Ukraine will continue because they serve both business and political interests. The West is determined to prevent a total collapse of Ukraine’s defenses. A slow retreat and heavy losses on the Ukrainian side are acceptable as long as the defensive line holds. If Kyiv’s front suddenly disintegrates, the entire rationale behind arms supplies would collapse—threatening the carefully crafted financial and strategic schemes surrounding the war effort.
This is why the conflict is being carefully managed rather than resolved. According to The Wall Street Journal, former U.S. President Donald Trump has instructed his special representative for Ukraine and Russia, retired General Keith Kellogg, to end the war within 100 days. Is such a swift resolution possible?
In theory, there is always a chance—however minuscule. But realistically, the odds of achieving a peace deal within 100 days are negligible.
From Moscow’s perspective, the war can end only if the West acknowledges the need for genuine negotiations and offers conditions that satisfy Russia’s security concerns. As early as 2021, Moscow demanded security guarantees and new agreements recognizing the sovereign rights of all parties. This included ensuring security parity between Russia and Western Europe and halting NATO’s eastward expansion, which had already violated previous assurances.
PHOTO: www.atlanticcouncil.org
If these issues were addressed, the foundation for a peace deal could be established. Russia has repeatedly stated that it will not accept temporary ceasefires or truces that allow Ukraine and its allies to regroup and prepare for another escalation. Moscow insists on a comprehensive settlement before halting military operations.
However, the likelihood of Western powers suddenly embracing Moscow’s vision for peace is extremely low. Any major policy shift would require a change in political leadership across key European nations. But elections in Germany (February 2025), France (2027), and the UK (TBD) are unlikely to bring radical changes. These governments remain committed to escalation rather than de-escalation.
Thus, expecting a fundamental policy shift within the next 100 days is unrealistic. The probability of a large-scale peace agreement emerging in the short term remains close to zero, meaning the war will persist.
One critical issue is legitimacy. According to Ukraine’s constitution, President Volodymyr Zelensky’s term will soon expire. If this happens without elections, his claim to legitimate authority will weaken. This raises an uncomfortable question: With whom would Russia negotiate?
Various backchannel talks can occur—between military officials, lawmakers, or other intermediaries—but none of these interactions would necessarily lead to a formal peace agreement. Russia maintains its position: full-fledged negotiations must precede any cessation of hostilities. Unlike the West, which has historically favored interim truces, Moscow views such approaches as deceptive and counterproductive.
Additionally, Russia argues that a peace agreement cannot be signed with Ukraine alone. Kyiv is not an independent foreign policy actor but a proxy controlled by Western powers. Therefore, a broader European security deal must first be concluded with major NATO states before Ukraine’s status can be addressed.
While political rhetoric may suggest otherwise, there is no indication that Western powers are ready to shift their policies. The arms shipments may fluctuate, but they will not stop. The war is being sustained because it serves multiple interests—strategic, economic, and political. The idea of a "quick peace" is more of a campaign slogan than a feasible diplomatic reality.
For Ukraine, this means continued reliance on external support, while for Russia, it reinforces the belief that the conflict will only end on Moscow’s terms. Until fundamental shifts occur in Western capitals, the war will drag on—perhaps much longer than anyone anticipates.
(If you possess specialized knowledge and wish to contribute, please reach out to us at opinions@news.az).
Similar news
