Why Europe is not rushing to defend the Strait of Hormuz

Editor's note: Einars Graudins is a military expert and a retired senior officer of the Latvian Armed Forces. The article reflects the personal opinion of the author and may not represent the views of News.Az.

The reluctance of European countries to actively participate in efforts to secure the Strait of Hormuz reflects not a single disagreement, but a convergence of strategic, military, political, and internal constraints that are shaping Europe’s current behavior.

At first glance, the issue appears paradoxical. The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most critical chokepoints in global energy logistics, through which a significant portion of the world’s oil supply passes. Any disruption there directly affects global markets and European economies in particular. Yet despite this, there is no unified European response, and NATO allies are not demonstrating the level of coordination one might expect under such circumstances.

The explanation begins with the military dimension. The idea of escorting oil tankers through the Strait, or establishing a sustained naval presence to guarantee freedom of navigation, may appear straightforward in theory. In practice, however, it is neither efficient nor sustainable.

History offers clear lessons. From the Suez Canal crises to tensions around the Panama Canal, convoy operations have always been temporary measures, not long-term solutions. They require constant deployment of naval assets, complex coordination, and significant financial resources. In a high-risk environment like the Persian Gulf, such operations would expose European forces to direct confrontation, with unclear strategic gains.

More importantly, convoying does not resolve the underlying conflict — it merely manages its symptoms.

The second layer is political, and here the situation becomes more nuanced. European governments, while publicly aligned with the United States, were in reality presented with a fait accompli when Washington and Tel Aviv escalated military actions against Iran. This has not gone unnoticed in European capitals.

In alliance politics, process matters. Decisions of such magnitude are expected to involve consultation and coordination. When they do not, even close partners recalibrate their level of engagement. This does not translate into open dissent, but it does produce a more cautious, restrained approach.

There is also a growing recognition in Europe that, despite extensive strikes on Iran’s military and political infrastructure, including attempts to decapitate key elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Iranian system has not collapsed.

On the contrary, Iran’s political and religious governance structures have demonstrated resilience. This reality forces European policymakers to confront an uncomfortable question: what is the actual endgame?

Without a ground operation, the ability to fundamentally alter Iran’s strategic posture remains limited. Yet a ground invasion of Iran is, under current conditions, virtually unthinkable.

Iran’s geography, its population of nearly 100 million, and the entrenched capabilities of its military and paramilitary structures make any such scenario extraordinarily costly and unpredictable. Even historical precedents, such as the Anglo-Soviet intervention during World War II, offer little relevance in today’s context.

For Europe, this translates into a clear strategic calculation: engagement without a viable path to resolution is a risk not worth taking.

Internal dynamics further complicate the picture. European societies are increasingly diverse, with large Muslim communities, some segments of which express sympathy for Iran’s position in its confrontation with the United States.

Governments in countries such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are acutely aware that external military engagement could have domestic repercussions. In an already fragile political environment, opening another front — this time internally — is a scenario they are keen to avoid.

At the same time, Europe remains deeply invested in Ukraine. The financial, military, and political burden of supporting Kyiv in its confrontation with Russia is substantial and ongoing. Resources are finite, and strategic focus is already stretched.

Compounding this is the perception of an evolving threat landscape closer to home. Recent developments in Russian military doctrine, including expanded provisions for deploying forces beyond national borders, are interpreted in Europe as signals of potential escalation risks for countries such as Finland, Sweden, the Baltic states, and Poland.

Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that European security priorities remain firmly anchored in their immediate neighborhood.

There is also a broader, more subtle shift underway in transatlantic relations. Recent international forums, including the Munich Security Conference, have highlighted growing differences in tone and expectations between Washington and its European partners.

Disputes and tensions — even over seemingly peripheral issues such as Greenland — have contributed to a climate in which Europe is increasingly inclined toward strategic caution and, in some cases, pragmatic neutrality.

Economic pressures, including rising fuel prices across Europe, only reinforce the urgency of the situation, but they do not override these structural considerations.

Finally, there is the weight of experience. Afghanistan remains a powerful reminder of how easily Western coalitions can enter conflicts in the Middle East, and how difficult it is to exit them. The images of 2021, when desperate civilians clung to departing aircraft, continue to shape strategic thinking in European capitals.

The lesson is clear: intervention is easy; disengagement is not.

Taken together, these factors explain the absence of European consolidation on the issue of the Strait of Hormuz. This is not simply a failure of unity within NATO, nor merely a question of political disagreement. It is a reflection of a deeper strategic reality.

For Europe, this is not the primary conflict.

At least not yet.

(If you possess specialized knowledge and wish to contribute, please reach out to us at opinions@news.az).

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