European Parliament has gone too far

The rupture between the European Parliament and Azerbaijan no longer appears to be an accidental diplomatic episode, but rather the logical outcome of accumulated contradictions. It is no longer just a series of resolutions and counterstatements — it reflects a deeper transformation in Baku’s relations with European institutions.

The issue is now less diplomatic and more political in nature. The contradictions have been building for years, and the already fragile relationship has finally broken down, News.Az reports.

The decision by the Milli Majlis to fully suspend parliamentary interaction with the European Parliament was an expected outcome.

Azerbaijan’s parliament has launched the procedure to withdraw from the Eastern Partnership Parliamentary Assembly. The final trigger was the resolution adopted on 30 April, calling for the return of Armenians who voluntarily left Karabakh. Following its adoption, EU Ambassador Marijana Kujundžić was summoned to Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry and handed a note of protest.

For a long time, Baku sought to maintain a working format of communication with Brussels, guided by the principle that dialogue is preferable to confrontation. However, dialogue requires reciprocity. In this case, there was no reciprocal engagement. Instead, only the European Parliament issued pre-prepared resolutions containing sweeping accusations.

In recent years, the European Parliament has adopted dozens of critical resolutions on Azerbaijan. Baku has been portrayed as the guilty party both before and after the 2020 war, as well as before and after the anti-terror operation of September 2023. In this narrative, Azerbaijan is consistently assigned responsibility. Although these resolutions have no binding legal force, they are presented as moral and political judgments and are often treated as such within EU institutions. This has been a major source of dissatisfaction on the Azerbaijani side.

When voting for yet another critical resolution, members of the European Parliament ignored the argument that Azerbaijan has acted within the framework of international law and the UN Charter, which recognises the right to self-defence. The 2020 war is viewed by Baku as an exercise of that right. Criticism of the 2023 anti-terror operation is seen by Azerbaijan as interference in its internal affairs, given that Karabakh is internationally recognised as part of its sovereign territory. In this view, the European Parliament exceeds its mandate. This is particularly notable given that Azerbaijan is neither an EU member nor seeks membership.

European Parliament resolutions are political declarations rather than legally binding acts. However, within European institutions they contribute to shaping negative perceptions of Azerbaijan.

Parliamentary diplomacy can only function on the basis of mutual respect and equality between parties. When a platform becomes a mechanism of political pressure, participation loses meaning. Against this backdrop, Azerbaijan has moved beyond symbolic steps, towards a broader institutional rollback: suspending the EU–Azerbaijan Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, initiating withdrawal from Euronest, and refusing participation in joint initiatives.

This is by no means a demarche. It is the result of processes that have been unfolding and intensifying over the past decade within the European Parliament. From this perspective, double standards, selective approaches and perceived bias have gone unanswered for too long.

According to this view, lobbying activity on Armenian-related regional issues within parts of the European Parliament has sought to advance Armenian interests by exerting political pressure on Azerbaijan. However, this objective has not been achieved. Instead, it has contributed to a gradual institutional rupture between Azerbaijan and EU structures.

One of the most sensitive aspects is the perceived selectivity of approaches. For decades, international organisations did not enforce their own decisions on the Karabakh conflict. UN Security Council resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Armenian forces remained unimplemented. Neither the European Parliament nor the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) applied comparable pressure on Armenia. From this perspective, if Yerevan had faced the same level of pressure as Baku, the Second Karabakh War might have been avoided. Yet once Azerbaijan restored its territorial integrity, pressure mechanisms were activated and critical rhetoric towards Azerbaijan intensified, despite its actions being framed as consistent with international law.

The European Parliament has never addressed the issue of the return of Azerbaijani refugees to Armenia. However, following the 2023 anti-terror operation, it began regularly adopting resolutions calling for the “dignified” return of Armenians who left Karabakh voluntarily. From this perspective, realities are presented in a reversed manner, with pro-Armenian narratives being more readily reflected.

Issues such as the return of Armenians and the release of convicted Armenian individuals have also, at times, been linked to the potential suspension of EU–Azerbaijan energy cooperation. This is viewed in Baku as interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, involving elements of political pressure and coercion.

The European Parliament has crossed a red line, beyond which Azerbaijan can no longer regard what it sees as provocative actions as mere political disagreements.

The situation is further aggravated by the European Parliament’s own reputational challenges. Scandals in recent years — from “Qatargate” to investigations into corporate lobbying — have undermined trust in the institution as a neutral platform. When a body facing internal transparency concerns simultaneously seeks to act as an external arbiter, it inevitably raises questions.

It is important to stress that this is not a rupture with Europe as a whole. The European Union remains an important partner for Azerbaijan in energy, trade and logistics. The Southern Gas Corridor, transport projects and broader economic cooperation continue to function. The break concerns a specific institution, not the overall framework of relations, and this distinction is crucial.

Contrary to what Baku’s critics might suggest, Azerbaijan is not withdrawing from the international system and has no intention of doing so. It is instead adjusting the format of its participation.

Azerbaijan’s decision demonstrates that its foreign policy is no longer built on seeking approval. It marks a transition towards a model in which the state independently determines which formats of cooperation are acceptable. This is not unprecedented. Other countries have taken similar steps, withdrawing from international organisations and severing ties with institutions that have lost their trust. Yet here, too, a perception of selectivity is raised: when Western states take such actions, it is described as a sovereign choice; when Azerbaijan does so, it is often labelled “isolation.”

Thus, the rupture between Azerbaijan and the European Parliament is neither an isolated episode nor an emotional reaction. It is a marker of a broader transformation in international relations — one in which states are increasingly unwilling to operate under rules they perceive as having been formulated without their participation.

By Tural Heybatov

News.Az